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II) KAIJNDA'S DILEA
A review of Richard Hall's book, The High Price of Principles:
Kaunda and the White South, Hodder & Stoughton, 1969, 35s.
by Geoffrey Wood*
Richard Hall has presented us with another entry in
the reading-list of Harold Wilson's conscience, alongside
Frederick Forsyth's The Biafra Story. The tenets of a
Western liberal-democracy mean very little when i elected
leader can so assiduously deny the principles for which
his party once stood over the only two major issues of
foreign policy in which Britain had the chance to take the
leading world role - U.D.I. in Southern Rhodesia, and the
Nigeria-Biafra war.
This book will make those committed to Zambia and the
future of black independent Africa, even more committed;
it will persuade the floating voter - still intent on
preserving the code of tolerance for which the last war
was fought. But in the last resort, will it could it
make any difference?
The image of the stereotyped journalist has been
discarded for this exercise; the author is not intent
upon dazzling us with rhetoric but tries rather to
convince us with an array of penetrating arguments support-
ed by undocumented evidence. (There are ten footnotes,
seven of which refer to other sections of the book).
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The author skîlfully weaves a number of themes:
the domestic politics of Zambia, Southern Rhodesia, South
Africa and Britain; the international and commercial
aims of South Africa and Britain; and Pan-Africanism -
symbolising the desire to attack the legacies of. colonial-
ism and achieve black majority rule from Southern Sahara
to the Cape. From this impressively wide-ranging field
of vision, Hall focusses on events in Zambia and Kaunda's
dilemma, a dilemma which existed before IJ.D.I. but which
was enormously exacerbated by it. Zambia has now
become, in Hall's phrase, 'the battleground for conflict-
ing ideologies', where the South African desire to
create strategic buffer states north of the Zambesi is
confronted by the Pan-Africanist determination to
remove apartheid constitutions to the south. With
Malawi now caught within South Africa's sphere of
influence, we are reminded that Zambia becomes the
outpost of black Africa and one which is physically,
economically and militarily vulnerable. Its resources -
rich in copper but poor in skilled manpower, administra-
tive competence and military strength - are increasingly
supplemented spiritually, if not economically, along
lines of support which run not to Britain but to
Tanzania and China. In this respect, Angola and
Nocambique are openly hostile neighbours - Mobutu and
Congo-Kinshasa can only be uncertain friends after the
previous antagonism of Noise Tshombe. Hall could have
pressed this case still further if he had included
Tshombe's previous support from Nkumbula and Zambia's
minority party - the African National Congress - which
is thought to favour a reconciliation with the South,
following the example of Banda in Malawi.
Bottomley's fright at Zambia's Independence
celebrations is amusingly described: the row over the
British South Africa Company's compensation was reaching
its climax, and Bottomley, in office only ten days as
Commonwealth Secretary,had read one file on it. He
arrived by plane in Lusaka to discover that the proposals
he brought were totally unacceptable. Decisively, he
announced that he would immediately fly back to receive
instructions from his master - only to be reminded that
it would be quicker to telephone. Funny, but revealing
both pathetic ignorance and an untarnished faith in bis
leader. Oh, to have leen a fly with ears on the wall of
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that tent when Bottomley told Emrys-Evans that the
going-rate for the B.S.A. Company's mineral rights had
slipped from £50 million to £4 million (half of it
taxable) in ten months. But Bottomley is not singled
out as a scapegoat for the British government's ineptitude
and eagerness to sidestep every major confrontation with
Smith. After his visit to Southern Rhodesia early in
1965, 'Bottomley was notably more cautious'. He had
gained shrewd insights into the militancy of Kaunda and
other African leaders. Hall traces the friction between
Bottomley, who was less prepared to court the favour of
the Tories, and Wilson - later remarking that Bottomley
'had no illusions about Smith's determination to cling to
power and regarded the missions to Salisbury as degrading.'
In contrast, Wilson's preoccupation with domestic politics
appears to have been compounded with an ignorance of the
historical events which clearly demonstrate the white
Southern Rhodesians' 'determination to cling to power'.
If there is an omission by Hall, it is the failure to
emphasise the previous difference between Zambia's
protectorate constitution and Southern Rhodesia's self-
governing constitution; and the particular impact of an
expatriate settler community in Southern Rhodesia
contrasted with the expatriate, profit-oriented activity
on the Copperbelt in what was Northern Rhodesia. The
story of Federation politics hinges on the desire to
remove profits from copper to the South and to reinforce
the expatriate interests in the South. Kaunda's
successful fight for independence prevented a similar
expatriate self-governing constitution north of the Zaxnbesi,
but he could never retrieve the previous loss of revenue
from copper, let alone confiscate the benefits. It is for
the protection of this investment that Smith declared
T.J.D.I.; and with Hunter fighter planes, bought with
Federal revenue, that he protects it. Wilson underestimated
the tenacity with which Smith and the 200,000 thorns in
his side would cling to this.
Kaunda, it emerges, was far more sympathetic to
Wilson's dilemma than vice-versa. Kaunda was prepared to
allow Wilson time to increase his majority to enable him
to tackle the vested interests of British commerce and the
white minority sympathisers in the Conservative Party.
To do this Kaunda had to jeopardise his own credit-rating,
particularly with the more militant members of his cabinet.
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1(apwepwe, for example, was eager that Britain's promises
of military aid for Zambia should be ignored, to leave
the way clear for an O.A.U. force. Thus, Wilson had
adeptly passed the problem of retaining cabinet
solidarity onto Kaunda. The Zainbian President suimned
up the situation very succinctly: 'what is good politics
in England may be bad politics in Africa.'
But this is only one of Kaunda's dileunnas, The
others are well described by Hall: the reconstruction
of external counication links in the attempt to
eliminate dependence on the South; the ironic increase
in dependence on imports from South Africa as a result
of boycotting Southern Rhodesian goods (Wankie coal
excepted); resisting pressure to perform a 'buffer'
role for South Africa; the ideological imperatives of
allowing nationalist guerilla forces to operate from
Zambian soil and the continual threat of reprisals from
the South; the scepticism of Western aid-donors and
investors as demonstrated by the pipeline from Dar es
Salaaxn to Ndoia and the Tan-Zam railway, with the conseq-
uent reliance on Chinese aid. All this on top of the
usual, but no less severe problems confronted by any
newly independent state in Africa or elsewhere: the
tensions created by tribal militancy; shortages in
qualified manpower bequeathed by the colonial regime;
disparity of income and consumption between the urban
and riral sectors; the prospect of rising imports and
rising inflation; the probability of declining prices
for copper, Zambia's major foreign exchange earner; and
providing satisfaction for ideological demands, reflectèd
in increasing state participation in the industrial
sector and the promotion of rural development. The list
is endless. In short, Zambia has had a raw deal -
ditche4 by Britain and left vulnerable.
The ground that these arguments fall on cannot be
all stony. The message is clear - the intransigence of
the British government has left Zambia isolated, and
no subsequent Conservative government will remedy that.
The damage has been inflicted, but some individuals may
repair some of that damage. It will be a shame if
Richard Hall's unveiling appeals only to the converted,
but the latter can shout from the rooftops, too.
* ** * * * * * * *
